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REVIEW
Enlightened common sense: the philosophy of critical realism, by Roy Bhaskar and
edited with a preface by Mervyn Hartwig, London, Routledge, 2016, 244 pp., £24.29
(softback), ISBN: 978-0415583794
When we learned of the death of Roy Bhaskar on 14th November 2014, the world appeared to
turn a little more slowly and more darkly. Something rare and precious had been taken from us
and those, like myself, who had never had the fortune to meet him, cleaved ever more tightly
to the books and ideas that he left as his legacy. Bhaskar’s oeuvre is of a daunting magnitude,
with 15 substantial monographs expounding various aspects and three developmental phases
of his philosophy of critical realism. Although his admirers and philosophical epigones are not
all card-carrying devotees – some being happy to remain in one rather than all of the three
broad conceptual phases of critical realism – no one can question the depth, complexity
and innovatory power of his work. However, Bhaskar’s prose is famously difficult, due to its ten-
dency to fissiparous conceptualization, extensive architectonic divisions and sub-divisions and
a neologistic flair that approaches the status of high art. All of this is crowned by a profligate use
of acronyms that can drive neophytes to distraction and have them reaching for the nearest
available copy of Hartwig’s blessed (2007) Dictionary of Critical Realism.
What is more, many of Bhaskar’s ideas assume a background familiarity with technical
philosophical jargon accumulated over several millennia. His work therefore encompasses
the ideas of the metaphysical Greeks, the medieval scholastics, the continental idealists,
post-Hegelians, post-Heideggerians and Husserlian phenomenologists; eventually culminating
in the latest post-Fregean semantics employed by Anglo-American analytical philosophers. His
range of reference is as broad and deep as the genealogy of philosophy itself and this inevita-
bly runs the risk of alienating those coming to critical realism from other disciplines where the
words ‘epistemic’ and ‘ontological’ might as well be written in Sanskrit.
It is therefore, at least from a hermeneutic point of view, somewhat fitting that Bhaskar’s last
completed work should be an abbreviated ‘summa’ of all that has gone before. Although it is
predictably demanding, the overwhelming impression is that this is far more an ‘hommage’ to
Bhaskar’s commitment to conceptual holism and systematic reticulation than it is to any desire
to provide pedagogic clarity and simplicity of formulation for the uninitiated. However, regard-
less of the evident challenges posed by the text, what is of no doubt is that the community of
critical realists, as well the wider reading public, and above all those future students of his ideas
approaching his ideas for the first time, will be forever grateful to Bhaskar for writing this book
in the teeth of progressive heart-failure. They will be similarly grateful to Mervyn Hartwig – a
tireless and brilliant disseminator of Bhaskar’s thought – for editing it so ably.
So, what have we been given? Enlightened Common Sense (henceforth ECS in acronymic def-
erence to the author) is nothing less than a superb synthesis and relatively concise overview of
the main phases of Bhaskar’s work. It is a textual revelation of both the diachronic development
of his ideas and a synchronic conspectus of their inter-relationships. Indeed, if one were to
read this volume with the marvellous Bhaskar/Hartwig (2010) Formation of Critical Realism:
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A Personal Perspective by one’s side, one would have the perfect biographical and conceptual
introduction to the critical realist system. Mindful as I am of the journal in which this review is
appearing and the familiarity of its readers with Bhaskar’s ideas, I have no intention to preach to
the converted or to lecture to the already wise and informed. However, it might be worth
making a few points as to what it is the reasonably attentive reader will gain from a close
perusal of this volume.
In just over 200 pages, Bhaskar covers every aspect of his critical realist project, taking the
reader through its successive developmental and programmatic phases and culminating in an
invigorating chapter that situates critical realism in relation to the history of philosophy as a
whole. As I have already implied, though the book is very much a summa rationis of Bhaskar’s
philosophical development it is not exactly a cosy vade mecum for the uninitiated. I would not
recommend this book to a neophyte without a health-warning, given the sheer density and
elevated conceptual temperature of the writing. The main advantage of this precious last
work and the reason it should be owned and regularly consulted by critical realists of all
stripes lies simply in its synoptic ambition as a tour ‘d’horizon’ of a vast conceptual landscape
that has been overwhelmingly planted, nutritiously cultivated and given its current mor-
phology by the author himself.
Now that we have the landscape before us, ECS allows us to see what its author has wrought
and on completing a reading of the book one is left in undoubted admiration for the philoso-
phical fertility and power of Bhaskar’s mind. The reach of the book and the critical realist project
as a whole is of an ambition and conceptual audacity not seen since Hegel, and in some
respects Bhaskar exceeds the reach of Hegel himself. We begin with a new paradigmatic phil-
osophy that re-situates the activity of science within an overwhelmingly naturalistic paradigm
and are propelled forward into the antechamber of a cosmological dialecticism whose ambi-
tion is nothing less than to reify the ontological and epistemic primordiality of a systemic
holism that transcends the dualism of subject and object. We then end our philosophical
roller coaster with the detailed vision of the ‘generalised co-presence’ and psycho-physical
interconnectedness of all things. That is some ride and, I would contend, more than worth
the price of admission entailed by the concentration and dedication required of the reader.
Indeed, progressing through the pages of the book one begins to realize the enormity of the
loss philosophy has sustained by Bhaskar’s death. Beginning in the 1970s, with his attack on
Humean empiricism and the driving of ontology by epistemology, one relishes as well as
admires Bhaskar’s forensic destruction of the ‘epistemic fallacy’ that so dominated philosophy
of science. This was accompanied by his rejection, root and branch, of the world-view that
came bundled with it; namely that there is a homogeneous, ontologically ‘flat’, unstructured
and essentially static cosmos in which all human life and ambition are conducted. Critical
realism united ‘what’ there is to know and its influence on ‘how’ we come to know and in
so doing restored a primordial human appreciation of the universe as infinitely vast,
complex, multiply stratified and a continual revelation to experimental probing and the
quest of the human mind to understand. ‘What does the world need to be like in order for
our experiments to generate the seemingly ambiguous diversity of results that they do?’ By
asking this seemingly innocent question, Bhaskar initiated almost a Copernican revolution
that changed the way that we understand the world. Bhaskar persuasively combined a
Kantian transcendental argument-form with an immanent critique of scientific method in
order to give birth to the critical realist project. One of the implications of this paradigmatic
change is that scientific experimentation, and explanation, had now to be seen as a socially
and communally ‘transitive’ practise that is itself formally and substantively determined by
the existence of an often recalcitrant, protean, multi-layered and complexly ‘intransitive’ uni-
verse. Such a universe will always be ‘deeper’ and more nuanced in its causal power-generating
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structure than is capturable by any one scientific or experimental question that any scientist
can ask of it. Consequently, the answers or humanly constructed ‘data’ that Nature gives
back often appear inconsistent, ambiguously diverse and redolent of further questioning
and ever more radical explanatory hypotheses to be framed. Science is progressive because
Nature is dynamically protean and heterogeneously powerful in the vast repertoire of possible
causal responses and effects it is capable of generating. If Bhaskar’s ontology was realistic, his
epistemology was relative and his hermeneutic approach, severely rational. Above all, science
must be seen as a profoundly and essentially ‘human’ activity and necessarily distinct from the
holistically stratified universe it seeks to relate to, epistemically. We simply cannot reduce the
universe to habitually conjugated patterns of anthropomorphically constructed ‘events’. ‘What
is’ cannot be reduced to ‘What I or we think it is’. Rather, science is a creative and ‘human all too
human’ activity that progresses according to the conceptual innovativeness and human artistry
with which we question nature and construct plausible causal hypotheses to explain the
phenomenal diversity that nature reveals to us. For Bhaskar, there is both an explanatory as
well as ontological ‘dialectic’ at work in the ongoing history of scientific explanation as, gradu-
ally, a continuously enriched cosmological structure is revealed to a paradigmatically shifting
human way of coming to psycho-physically understand and interact with that world.
Nature is endlessly generative of causal powers and effects, as is the human mind infinitely
constructive of hypothetical mechanisms and models designed to explain the works of those
causal powers. Nature does not simply reveal the finished blueprint of an infinitely stratified
structure but it palpably and necessarily behaves dynamically. Our ontological constructs
must therefore embrace the concepts of ‘change’ and ‘process’ as well as those of structure
and complexity. Where you have structured complexity and an ontological dynamic you
then necessarily come face to face with the concept and reality of ‘emergence’. This ontological
dynamic and the concomitant dialectical relationship between knower and known, with the
inevitable dynamic instability that implies, results in the necessary foregrounding of the impor-
tance, for Bhaskar, of the ‘social’. If science is indeed a human and therefore a social and
‘communal’ practice, then any understanding of phenomena must include both the knower
and the way that knower comes to his or her understanding, seen as part of a viable and
rationally coherent explanatory naturalism.
ECS beautifully and parsimoniously describes and explains the three main ‘phases’ of critical
realism in terms of basic critical realism, dialectical critical realism and meta-reality, and the sub-
divisions within each phase, such as transcendental realism, critical naturalism and explanatory
critique. It includes the ‘transitional’ relationships between these phases, although emphasis is
given in the book to basic critical realism. The basic credo that Bhaskar is intent on promulgat-
ing, whether in natural philosophy or social science, is that it is the nature of the object that
determines how it should be studied by the subjective mind of the knower. This ontological and
epistemic credo contains within it the essence of the Bhaskarian world-view. As one reads
this book one is continually prodded into thinking that Bhaskar’s relation to Kant is isomorphic
to Marx’s relation to Hegel. Bhaskar’s early work literally inverted Kantian transcendentalism
and repudiates the notion that ‘how’ we are as cognitive beings itself determines and mediates
what experience, and hence knowledge, we have of a reality that must always elude us in terms
of its ultimate essence. Bhaskar replaces that subjective epistemic with the philosophical
understanding of a reality, the very dynamic and processual complexity of which, mediates
and determines the parameter-space within which our knowledge of reality is possible. In
other words, reality morphogenetically determines and drives our epistemology, a Copernican
inversion that reminds one inevitably of the way in which Marx found it necessary to materially
ground and concretize the Hegelian dialectic of human mind and universal spirit and so
instantiate that reciprocal dualism within the tectonic movement of historical events and
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the constructed technologies which necessarily shape human consciousness and ideology. For
readers of this journal, I need not go into details of Bhaskar’s understanding of the ‘transapplic-
ability’ of critical realism from the natural to the social sciences and the ‘transformational’
model of the way in which social activity is both pre-existing and continuously changed by
human agency. The take-home message that Bhaskar’s work continually transmits to the
reader is that societies and social events are as much naturalistic components of the universal
order as are any other structured phenomena. They are equally complex and immanently labile
and are changed ‘by’ as well as transformative ‘of’ those social scientists, politicians, civil ser-
vants, bureaucrats, technocrats, business people and plain Joes on the Clapham omnibus
that compose such social complexes. Indeed, social phenomena are even more recalcitrant
to the knowing mind than so called natural phenomena, for they are not only generatively
opaque in terms of the causal powers that produce them, but they are also deeply sensitive
contextually and hence far less amenable to the establishing of experimentally closed systema-
tic investigation. What is more, social reality is activity – and concept – sensitive as well as being
far more constrained spatio-temporally than other natural phenomena. This has the effect of
rendering any social hermeneutic as both ontologically (and consequently epistemically)
‘enfolded’ within the phenomenal envelope that hermeneutic purports to study and render
perspicuous to the human mind. For any Bhaskarian realist, verstehen is therefore a far more
delicately nuanced activity than is wissenschaft.
Another message that the reader cannot help absorbing from this book is the importance of
what Bhaskar provocatively termed ‘seriousness’ in philosophical life. Seriousness is, for
Bhaskar, a basic requirement of intellectual virtue and probity. It insists that we unite theory
and practice in a fused praxis that gives appropriate respect to the importance of the philoso-
phical quest for enlightenment. Philosophy is therefore not simply a remote armchair-bound
pursuit removed conveniently from the possibly negative and discomforting consequences
of our theorizing; but it is a practical and ultimately a utilitarian propaedeutic to the achieving
of a transformative and salvific understanding of how things actually ‘are’ between the
knowing human mind and the natural order that generated that mind. This relationship con-
tinuously fructifies the human mind as part of the very same multiply stratified and dynamic
reality that is cause and reason, both of the existence of subject and object, and of the possible
transcending of that, ultimately misplaced, duality. Though one might assume that Kant, Hegel,
Marx and Sankara are the tutelary spirits behind the genealogy of critical realism, I would also
like to suggest that Spinoza be increasingly studied as an influence on Bhaskar given the cen-
trality of concepts such as structural dynamism, emergence, the mereological expressivism of
human and other modal parts to that of Nature itself, the transcending of subject and object
and the virtuousness of adequate and clear knowledge in Spinoza’s mature thinking as
revealed in his magnum opus, the Ethics.1 In ECS (100–1) Bhaskar does briefly describe what
he calls the ‘Spinozan Moment’ of transformative understanding in which false dualisms are
superseded and ultimately eliminated in a cognitively enhanced form of agent-praxis.
Many have found the dialectical phase of the Bhaskarian system to be difficult, rebarbatively
obscure or simply confusing and there is no doubt that both Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom
(1993) and chapter 6 of ECS make severe demands on the reader patience and attention.
However, the treatment of dialectic in ECS is definitely the more exegetically and discursively
palatable of the two alternatives. This is because ECS easily, and relatively quickly, establishes
how the dialectical phase of Bhaskar’s thought relates to what went before and what came
after. That very capability brings a degree of clarity and illumination to the task of understand-
ing this impressively detailed and conceptually innovative phase of Bhaskar’s system, for a
system it very much is; and one becomes aware, on deeper reading of ECS, of the degree to
which Bhaskarian dialectics is of a conceptual and methodological piece with basic critical
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realism and meta-reality. Bhaskarian dialectic involves a rejection of ontological ‘monovalence’
and instead advocates for the ontological and epistemic importance of that inter-linked con-
ceptual troika: absence, negativity and presence. A powerful case is made for including nega-
tivity and absence as ontologically, and therefore explanatorily, potent in the intransitive
natural order; as well as in the transitive context of human subjectivity and social experience.
We learn that the generative negates or sublates the absent as well as negating the pre-exist-
ent, which accordingly, is understood as an underlying and yet ever changing continuant. Dia-
lectic does not, for Bhaskar, simply involve the redistribution of parts within the natural order
but it betokens the emergence of novelty, particularly evident within the social context, and
this in itself requires that we forge the concept of transformation in order to systematically
encapsulate that phenomenon. The conceptual dialectic of absence, negativity and presence
allows us to properly come to terms with an infinitely labile cosmological reality that is
multi-layered, ontologically discontinuous and tending to distinct transformative rupture as
the foundation of generative emergence. What is important about Bhaskar’s work is that it
gives us the conceptual tools and the ontological ‘vision’ that enable us to explain and coun-
tenance social emergence and transformation in such a way that we are then able to cogni-
tively widen our explanatory schema and fundamentally connect socially emergent
phenomena with the infinitely more encompassing natural order, as part of a consistent and
conceptually seamless explanatory naturalism that understands and situates all social phenom-
ena as ultimately miniscule parts of that infinitely overarching and structurally generative cos-
mology. Bhaskar’s ontology can therefore be understood as a powerful instantiation of what we
might call mereological holism in which constitutive parts interact dialectically not only with
each other but with the whole of which they form constituent, though sub-optimally ‘real’
parts. In so doing they both transform and are, in turn, transformed. This holism is both onto-
logical and epistemic, which makes it both unique and important as a dialectically ‘polysemic’
form of explanation. It is this holism that accounts for the bipolarity of both presence and
absence as defining properties of changing continuants; as well as the historical genealogy
that also provides an explanatory causal narrative determining the nature of pre-existent,
pre-labile continuity and the causal generation of morphogenetic novelty in the world. What
is more, the use by Bhaskar of the concept of dialectical ‘negation’ in tandem with that of
‘absence’ allows him to fashion nothing less than an ontologically grounded axiology of
being. Thus, deprivation and sub-optimality (the experience of poverty or rain deprived soil
conditions for example) induce the social or natural movement towards transformative
change and the stimulation of nature’s causal powers in a productively beneficent way. This
enables the achievement of holistic optimality and homeostatic equilibrium in nature, or
justice and equality in society. In this sense, Bhaskar’s work follows ideologically, as well as phi-
losophically, in the tradition of Hegel and Marx. Speaking personally, I have found it to be far
more insightful and conceptually persuasive than Sartre’s attempt to produce an ideologically
acceptable critique of dialectical reason. This is because Bhaskar’s dialectic is profoundly linked
to a metaphysical naturalism and a coherent cosmological world-view that gives it far greater
conviction and explanatory power. The true logic of emancipation is thereby rendered far more
scientifically acceptable and philosophically perspicuous as both a concept and a practice.
Metaphysically, Bhaskar was also an abstract realist who did not believe in a transcendent
world of Platonic forms but rather in a world in which abstract concepts are ‘concretized’ or
embedded in specific morphological structures that specifically differentiate the existence of
transfactually applicable properties. That very structural specificity is further instantiated and
expressed via a genealogical causal narrative that accounts for the ultimate uniqueness of
any universally concretized properties in the world order. To put it simply: no two Mars bars
are ‘exactly’ the same. The dialectical holism with which Bhaskar operates connects and
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relates the constituent ‘parts’ of systems ‘intra-actionally’ rather than ‘inter-actionally’. In other
words, change is both causally immanent as well as causally transitive. This applies importantly
to concepts such as ‘meaning’ and ‘truth’ which are considered by Bhaskar to be inherently
relative and labile as are ontological structures. In this way, the dialectical embraces and
enfolds within itself the analytical which, in the Anglo-American philosophical tradition, influ-
enced as it is overwhelmingly by positivist considerations, has shown a historical tendency to
believe in the static and unwavering rigidity of meaning as a semantic concept. In this sense,
Bhaskar believes that what he calls dialectical ‘constellationality’ includes, enfolds or embraces
the analytic within it as a form of aufheben or Hegelian-like ‘sublation’. However, unlike the
Hegelian dialectic, CR dialectics begins with a labile cosmological reality whose properties
and ultimate meaning are essentially irreducible and non-essential. One therefore starts
from non-identity and a non-reified and polymorphous concept of negativity. Bhaskar’s uni-
verse is essentially Heraclitean; and thought, agency and spontaneously occurring intentional-
ity are thereby understood as constituent elements of what is means to exist at all, both
naturalistically as well as socially. Bhaskar’s fundamental assault is upon the analytical ontology
and narrative hermeneutic of stasis, meaning-rigidity and Parmenidean-inspired invariance
that together foster the restrictive, confining and socially controlling relations of power, influ-
ence, affluence and hegemonic domination that pervade the social universe.
Bhaskar’s holism is, in this sense, both unremitting and socially progressive. He sees any ten-
dency towards de-totalization as having the effect of undermining the importance and efficacy
of change in the world. His consistent assault upon the analytic and the atomistic is not simply a
progressive movement in the direction of intellectual enlightenment. It is rather a profoundly
constitutive characteristic of the quest for human freedom and self-control. Yet, at the same
time, Bhaskar is equally intent upon combatting the impoverished and deeply fallacious
‘anthropocentrism’ and ‘anthroporealism’ that holds the human mind in the iron-embrace of
a pre-Copernican vision of the world and of our relationship to the cosmic world order. Bhas-
kar’s nightmare is the static, axiologically barren, uniform, repetitive and serf-like existence of
the ‘McDonalised World’. One suspects his reaction to a ‘Donald’ in the White House would
have been predictably scathing.
As far as Bhaskar is concerned, we can only foster the free-flourishing of the human mind
and body and the social body politic as part of a dialectically reciprocal holism and union of
inter-subjective minds and bodies that understands that the freedom of each is a necessary
condition for the freedom and psycho-physical flourishing of all. Such flourishing also requires
morphogenetic insight and control and the rational understanding of both nature’s and our
own causally generative powers. Science and philosophy then take their place as parts of
what Bhaskar calls a ‘totalising depth praxis’ that understands knowledge-acquisition as
itself a central component of the human quest for structural freedom. Bhaskar’s inspiring
vision of dialectical freedom, beautifully explored and expressed in chapter 6, is of an ascend-
ing trellis of dialectically nested freedoms which begins with the simple contrarian ability to ‘do
otherwise’ and culminates in a ‘universal concretely singularized human autonomy or flourish-
ing’. This may well be a typical example of Bhaskar’s tendency to the verbal baroque but what it
really stands for is the expression and realization of a truly ‘eudaimonistic society’, nothing less
than the psycho-social realization of happiness and inter-subjective harmony that is in the
direct lineage of Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Rousseau, Marx, Rawls and the philosophers of the
East. Bhaskar is able to fuse ontology, epistemology and axiology in a seamless conceptual
embrace which is an accomplishment that has the effect of completely dissolving the
Humean ‘naturalistic fallacy’ as did the Greeks with their use of the ‘telos’ by which they
could impose ‘virtue’ onto an otherwise oblivious cosmos.
6 REVIEW
A reading of ECS convinces one that much of Bhaskar’s work is nothing less than a sustained
‘revolt against dualism’, against the ‘irrealism’ of those prejudicially false dichotomies such as
‘subject and object’, ‘slavery and freedom’ that lead to lives of qualitative subservience and
mental constraint. The historically mediated dualisms between religion and spirituality, the
sacred and the profane, the natural and the supernatural, are similar antinomies of control
and psycho-physical restraint, as far as Bhaskar is concerned, and which his life and thought
were dedicated to overcoming. His third-phase ‘philosophy of meta-reality’ is designed to
accomplish such a psycho–physical re-orientation by first rendering identity as hegemonic
with respect to difference and unity and second by postulating non-duality as transcendent
with respect to any purported and deeply misleading schizoid cleavage between mind and
body. Atomism and Parmenidean ‘blockism’ must be philosophically subordinated to the
reality of space-time and the processuality that they entail. The universe and our lives as
parts of that holism are inherently dynamic and immanently morphogenetic. Identity is conse-
quently an arboreal and differentially expressive concept in Bhaskar’s work.
The culmination of Bhaskar’s meta-philosophy is surely the doctrine of ‘generalised co-pres-
ence or interconnectedness’, a form of systemic or mereological holism that collapses and
interfuses the false dualisms indicated above. At this level of being and understanding, materi-
ality is a pure form of ontological and epistemic inclusivity that enfolds or includes within it any
and all forms of religious belief or, for that matter, non-belief. Social eudaimonism is therefore
predicated on the essential dissolution of the ‘I-Thou’, ‘Subject-Object’, ‘Self and Other’ dual-
isms and on the instantiation of a ‘logic of inter-implication’ or entailment which predicates
the fulfilment of ‘self’ and ‘other’ as being dialectically reciprocal. In this way, the social
becomes enfolded implicationally within and expressed by the cosmological. This sort of
dialectical eudaimonism is similar to the view of Spinoza, who believed that the human
psycho–physical self was not only given whatever sub-optimal reality it has by the generative
expressivity of an infinite nature (synonymous, for Spinoza, with God) but that the rational
intuition of such a reality necessarily entails the construction of an overwhelmingly rational
society, what we might call a ‘rational gemeinschaft’, based upon the inter-subjective fulfilment
and flourishing of other rational minds. This important theme of dialectical heteronomy is also
to be found in the liberal theory of justice developed by John Rawls.
The teleology at work here, for Bhaskar, is what we might call ‘positive Weberianism’ or the
attaining of both an individual and collective psycho–physical state of ‘re-enchantment’ of the
world, the perception of a universe suffused with value, virtue and meaning. At such a point of
hermeneutic singularity there exists generalized co-presence in which all dualities are trans-
cended and there exists the realization of individual and cosmos or God. Once again, this is
a profoundly Spinozistic vision as well as being a philosophical vision of great conceptual
beauty.2
I hope that I have conveyed to the reader some of the riches enfolded within the pages of
this remarkable book, reflective of a lifetime of deep and radically innovative thinking by its
author. There is an obvious poignancy that attends the realiszation we will hear no more
from this truly remarkable mind. In conclusion, I would like to make two points. First, everyone
coming to Bhaskar’s work for the first or the umpteenth time should be aware of the challenges
Bhaskar had to face throughout his life as he fashioned the vast panoply of thought this book
encapsulates. Bhaskar was forever an ‘outsider’ to established ways of thinking and to the aca-
demic and organizational establishment that attempted to marginalize and suppress the
powerful heterodoxy of his ideas. Unfairly and cynically denied the imprimatur of an Oxford
D.Phil, Bhaskar was the eponymous wandering scholar, forever searching for the learned
haven that would appreciate his talent and provide a true heimat for the elaboration of his
ideas. The unfortunate fact is that he never succeeded in finding that sustaining institutional
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hospitality and respect; for much of Bhaskar’s academic life was conducted under conditions of
professional insecurity and financial asperity. Bhaskar was not the first, nor will he be the last, to
suffer in this way. However, it is a salutary fact that such a profoundly talented and influential
thinker was deprived of a professorial chair in the UK and had to be content with the grandilo-
quent title of ‘World Scholar’ at an institution that was only prepared to offer him a part-time
contract of employment. The last 13 years of Bhaskar’s life were conducted under the discom-
fiting auspices of ill health and relative penury. Of course, his sheer ebullience of spirit and
loving kindness towards others were repaid by the love and friendship of those privileged
to be close to him. This book, conceptually challenging and densely rich with ideas as it is,
will remain the most authentic conspectus of the vast and powerfully transformative architec-
ture of ideas bequeathed to us by this great thinker.
I would also like to pay compliment to the editor of this book, Mervyn Hartwig, whose ded-
ication to critical realism, to the life and work of Bhaskar, and to the dissemination of critical
realist theory continues to inspire and to instruct.
Notes
1. I have recently completed a substantial monograph on Spinoza’s mature philosophy of natur-
alistic explanation entitled MindFul of Nature (forthcoming), in which I provide a detailed dis-
cussion of these concepts as they relate to Spinoza’s philosophy of mind and action.
2. For Spinoza also believed that the relative unreality of the modal human individual can only
partake of the intellectualized experiencing of eternity by intuitively and rationally relating to
nature in such a way that the individual human mind no longer perceives itself as an existing
individuated psycho-physical ‘subject’ or ego. Instead, those previously human, fallacious and
quotidian perceptions that normally constitute the substantive content of a specific human
mind are extinguished by the overwhelmingly rational perception of the interconnection of
all objects within the mind and extension of Nature as such. At the point of supremely rational
meditation, which is the highest form of knowledge, the human mind becomes a part of the
infinitely recursive thought that is the mind of Nature itself.
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